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ABSTRACT 
 
Cyber-Terrorism continues to confront the country with security threats.  Since the September 11 
attack, academia has not fully implemented in educational offerings a deterrence strategy satisfactory 
to the government.  Though the National Security Agency has introduced Centers of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance Education, as an appropriate education program, there are only 
a small number of schools in the country that have enabled their offerings through this program.  The 
focus of this study is to explore in survey the critical failure factors impacting the implementation of 
Centers of Academic Excellence education in academic institutions, by initially sampling schools in 
the Northeast Corridor of the United States.  This study contributes to the discussion of important 
considerations for academic and governmental officials to further enable security strategy in this era 
of the cyber-terrorist. 
 
 
“The United States must come to terms with … cyber-security.  We have enemies.  They are smart.   They will use our 
technology against us.   They will attack the seams of our technology infrastructure.   Our technology, like society, is 
… interdependent.   The only way to counter this threat is for … government and [industry and academia]  to work 
together.” – Richard Clarke, Former Special Advisor on Cyber-Security, White House Office of Homeland Security 
(Heiman, 2002) 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
he Internet benefits society.  Domestically and globally, the Internet continues to enable improvement 
in the livelihood of citizens and their institutions.  Economic, governmental and military 
infrastructures depend upon innovation that is expedited through cyberspace, the international network 
of interconnected systems and technologies on the World Wide Web of the Internet.  Integration of banking, energy, 
health, telecommunication and transportation systems on the Web facilitates consumer and industrial interaction faster 
than earlier mechanisms of technology.  The Internet is clearly critical in the efficient functioning of society in the 21
st
 
century. 
 
The country however is challenged in the continued functioning of infrastructure systems and the Internet.  
Enemies are conscious of its dependency on the open connectivity of the Web.  The National Research Council as 
early as 1996 indicated the growing reliance on vulnerable information infrastructures as “the information security 
problem” (Crowley, 2003).  International terrorists are experts in sophisticated techniques that can attack the 
technological infrastructures of the country.  Their tools can disguise a strategic threat costing trillions of dollars 
(Verton, 2002), as the techniques are not dissimilar from those exploited by casual culprits.  The tools allow the threat 
of terrorists having the expertise of skilled hackers to be increased to substantial effect.  The threat of an “electronic 
Pearl Harbor” (Webster, 1998) is considered heightened due to the physically destructive September 11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon and those of the United States on terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Kirkpatrick, 2002). 
 
T 
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Efforts to secure key economic infrastructures from cyber-terrorism are not considered to be encouraging in 
the practitioner literature (Greenemeier, 2004, Petersen, 2004, Hunter & Mogull, 2003 & Sarkar, 2004).  Studies 
indicate higher incidents of software flaws that have enabled increased hacker attacks and infrastructure downtime in 
2004.  These flaws have cost the economy almost $60 billion (Hulme, 2004, page 54).  Cyber-security is indicated to 
be costly and difficult to deploy, due to evolving technologies, and to be deficient in half of industry having not 
intrusion-prevention systems but mere intrusion-detection tools (Hulme, 2004, page 86).  Government is noted to be 
negligent in not formulating integrated government and industry security strategy (Hulme, 2004, page 26 & Verton, 
2004).  Studies of the Meta Group indicate in an adapted Figure 1 that few firms in industry have excellent security 
strategy, irrespective of government.  Given increased sophistication in threats and issues in implementing systems, 
further efforts in improving security strategy are important in defending the technological infrastructures of the 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Information Security Market, 2004 
Source: Meta Group, 2004 
 
In launching the War on Terrorism in 2001, President Bush cited multidimensional efforts in defending the 
country (Roberto & Carioggia, 2002).  Inclusion of security education from academia is important, but is not a 
frequently heralded initiative in this war (Berinato, 2003).  Institutions have diverse engineering, information systems 
and computer science curriculum models integrating security education.  These models may not be effective in a 
current cyber-terrorist security strategy. Programs often furnish more broad, core and theoretical learning and less 
practical, specific and time-to-exploit experience that links the learning to the external environment of security 
(Evans, 2003, page 6).  Other limitations can include internal faculty not familiar with best government and industry 
practices in security strategy (Evans, 2003, page 12), out-of-date programs technologically (Bennett, 2004), and 
slowness in updating the programs (Evans, 2003, page 169). 
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Limitations in curriculum models may hinder security education in a time of increased sophistication of 
technologies and terrorist threats.  Improvements in traditional models lag, due to daunting and lengthy internal 
procedures and external accreditation programs.  The highly specific requirements of security limit linking of 
education models to market needs, than would be the case for generic skills (Evans, 2003, page 39).  Skills of a 
security professional include an estimated 13 years of general technology experience, 7 years in security and several 
security related certifications, including Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) (Thibodeau, 
2004).  Not having taught graduates initial security skills needed by government and industry (Miller, 1997) is almost 
a threat to an efficient and effective information technology strategy (Datz, 2004, page 56), if not a security strategy.  
Such a threat necessitates a focused education strategy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A security education strategy is introduced in the Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 
program, established by the federal government.  This program is managed by the National Security Agency, in 
compliance with the Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), on the National Policy on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, of May 1998 (National Security Agency, 2004, Information Assurance Courseware Evaluation Program).  
The intent of the program is to lessen vulnerabilities of the country to cyber-terrorism by furthering undergraduate and 
graduate education in information assurance and by designating academic institutions that furnish this education.  
Information assurance is defined below: 
 
“Information operations that protect … information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.” (National Security Agency, Committee on National Security 
Systems [CNSS], NSTISSI 4009, 2004) 
 
Center of Academic Excellence institutions are formally recognized by the National Security Agency, and 
students are aggressively recruited by industry and government if they have specific security skills learned in the 
program. 
 
The Center of Academic Excellence program requires academic institutions to be compliant with criteria 
from standards of the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee 
(NSTISSC) (National Security Agency, 2004, National Information Assurance Education & Training Program).  The 
criteria consists of Standard NSTISSI 4011 and one of NSTISSI Standards 4012, 4013, 4014 and 4015, as defined in 
Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Center of Academic Excellence Standards 
NSTISSI Standard Definition 
4011 National Training Standard for Information Systems Security (INFOSEC) Professionals 
4012 National Training Standard for Designated Approving Authority (DAA) 
4013 National Training Standard for System Administration in Information Systems Security 
4014 National Training Standard for Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) 
4015 National Training Standard for Systems Certified [Staff] 
     Source: National Security Agency, National Information Assurance Education & Training Program, 2004 
 
 
The criteria defined by the National Security Agency to evaluate the depth and maturity of curricula in 
information assurance in institutions is in Table 2 below: 
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Table 2: Center of Academic Excellence Criteria 
Criteria / Category for Measurement Source 
Partnerships in Information Assurance Education National Security Agency, 
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
Shared Curriculum  
Shared Faculty 
Reciprocity of Credits 
Information Assurance as a Multi-Disciplinary Science, Not a 
Separate Discipline 
National Security Agency, 
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
Information Assurance as Modules in Existing Courses / Non-
Technical Students Introduced to Information Assurance 
 
Information Assurance Concentration Programs in Non-Technical 
Courses 
Information Assurance Not Only in Teaching, but Encouraged 
as a Practice in University 
National Security Agency,  
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
University or Departmental Information Assurance Security Plan  
Information Assurance Awareness Program for Faculty and Students 
University Information Systems Security Officer 
Research in Information Assurance Encouraged as a Practice in 
University    
National Security Agency, 
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
Information Assurance Program with Dissertation, Thesis or Project 
Requirements 
 
Information Assurance Courses with Research Papers or Projects 
Non-Information Assurance Courses with Papers or Projects in 
Information Assurance 
Information Assurance Curriculum beyond Geographic Borders 
of University 
National Security Agency,  
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
Information Assurance Curriculum Web Site  
Information Assurance Distance Education Technology 
Information Assurance Colloquia and Curriculum Workshops 
Sponsored by University 
Information Assurance Certificate Professional Studies Program 
Faculty Active in Information Assurance Practice and Research 
and Contributing to Information Assurance Literature 
National Security Agency, Centers of 
Academic Excellence, 2004 
Faculty Information Assurance Papers Published in Refereed 
Journals 
 
 
 Faculty Information Assurance Education and / or Research Grants 
Faculty Information Assurance Presentations at Conferences 
State of the Art Information Assurance Library, References and 
Resources 
National Security Agency, Centers of 
Academic Excellence, 2004 
Availability of INFOSEC Educational Materials  
Availability of Historical Information Assurance Materials 
Declared Concentrations of Programs National Security Agency, Centers of 
Academic Excellence, 2004 
Information Assurance at Bachelor of Science Level  
Enrolled Students 
Graduated Students 
Information Assurance at Master of Science Level 
Enrolled Students 
Graduated Students 
Information Assurance at Doctorate Level 
Enrolled Students 
Graduated Students 
Declared Center for Information Assurance Education or Center 
for Information Assurance Research 
National Security Agency, 
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
School Level  
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University Level 
Full Time University Information Assurance Faculty National Security Agency, 
Centers of Academic Excellence, 2004 
Full Time Faculty with Information Assurance Program 
Responsibility 
 
Additional Full Time Faculty 
Intra or Inter Departmental or External University Shared Faculty 
Adjunct / Part Time Faculty 
  
Other University Information Assurance Education 
Partnerships * 
Lawler, Li and De Leon, 2005 
Partnerships with Universities and Schools  
Partnerships with State and / or Federal Agencies 
Partnerships with Corporations 
Partnerships with INFOSEC 
Partnerships with Trusted Products / Vendors 
University Other * Lawler, Li and De Leon, 2005 
Matriculated Information Assurance Students Employed in Security 
Positions 
 
Matriculated Information Assurance Students Employed in 
Corporate Security Positions 
Matriculated Information Assurance Students Employed in 
Government Security Positions 
Enrolled Information Assurance Students Employed in Security 
Internships 
These criteria were included in the study by the authors, in order to evaluate interactions with governmental 
and industrial institutions in a potential security strategy.  
 
 
Institutions designated as Centers of Academic Excellence are required to be current in security education, 
and if current are re-designated Centers of Excellence in the third academic year.  The National Security Agency 
evaluates its criteria to be current each year.  Clearly, security education designed from criteria of the Center of 
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance program is a helpful, if not critical, component in fighting cyber-
terrorism. 
 
From an overall 1,800 institutions in the country, and 470 in the Northeast Corridor (U.S. News & World 
Report, 2004), there are only 59 as of February 2005 that are designated Centers of Academic Excellence in 
Information Assurance (National Security Agency, 2004, Centers of Academic Excellence – Institutions).  The 
government program initiated in 1998.  Though industry and government need graduates with specific security skills 
(Weinberger, 2004), non-Center of Excellence academic institutions may be limited in implementing a Center of 
Excellence model by historic inertia.  Scholarly studies imply short perspective (Kim, Shim and Yoon, 1999) and 
slowness of faculty (Lightfoot, 1999, Maglitta, 1996 & Lee, Trauth & Farwell, 1995) in improving curriculum models 
important to industry.  These studies indicate the importance of industry in helping institutions to update models 
(Srinivasan, Guan & Wright, 1999), though only a small number of institutions appear to be implementing immediate 
improvements in security education.  The perception may be that non-Centers of Academic Excellence are not fully 
cognizant of the cyber-terror threat. 
 
The reality is that academic institutions that include computer science, engineering and information systems 
schools are affected by an evolution in the field security education.  Computer science and information systems are 
impacted by a new definition of information assurance, as both a technology and a process management discipline 
(Kahan, 2004).  The evolving frame of reference of specific security skills needed by industry and government in a 
counter cyber-terrorism strategy is new to these departments.  Practitioner studies indicate that non-Center of 
Academic Excellence institutions are implementing new education and skill models (Thurrott, 2004), but the models 
are frequently that of including a few courses in information security (Whitman & Mattord, 2004), not that of 
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improving curriculum programs (Kahan, 2004).  Such limited models can benefit from Center of Academic 
Excellence in Information Assurance standardization. 
 
Issues in the limitations of current non-Center of Academic Excellence models of institutions may be in 
factors that hinder compliance to Center of Excellence standards.  Studies indicate the difficulty of faculty not having 
knowledge requirements in information security in initiating a Center of Excellence model (Kahan, 2004).  Other 
issues may be in a need for funding, and for further guidance, by the National Security Agency in helping non-Center 
of Excellence institutions, or in a possible need for flexibility in the Center criteria and NSTISSC standards.  Study of 
the failure of non-Center of Excellence institutions in specific Excellence requirements may enable improvement in 
the security education strategy of these institutions and subsequent initiative in the Center of Excellence program.  
Educational systems that cultivate the specific requirements of information security increase the likelihood that 
students will have the skills to confront cyber-terrorism (Irvine, Chin & Frincke, 1998). 
 
FOCUS OF PRELIMINARY STUDY 
 
The focus of the study is to explore the importance of Center of Academic Excellence criteria factors 
perceived as contributing to the small number of academic institutions designated Centers of Excellence in 
Information Assurance.  Though institutions already designated Centers of Excellence enable analysis of success 
factors, analysis of potential failure factors in non-Centers of Excellence having charters in information systems and 
computer science education furnishes fresh insight that can help the latter institutions in planning for designation.  The 
study is initiated in Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) institutions in the Northeast 
Corridor of the country, a key hub of information infrastructures that can benefit from improved security.  Non-Center 
of Excellence ABET institutions in general in this region continue to enhance their curricula in security technology.  
Research is limited in the impact of the effectiveness of their programs in an eventual Center of Academic Excellence 
strategy. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methodology of the current phase of the study consisted of an analysis of a sample of non-
Center of Academic Excellence ABET institutions in states of the Northeast Corridor of the country.  (The study 
originated in a competitive analysis of the security curricula of institutions by the School of Computer Science and 
Information Systems at Pace University, in New York City, in July – September 2003.  The analysis was performed in 
conjunction with the application of the university to be a Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance. 
The National Security Agency approved the application in 2004.)  The institutions in this study have had information 
systems, engineering and / or computer science schools since 1985.  Total faculty in the institutions is from 3,400 to 
320 full-time and from 810 to 25 part-time.  Total students are from 28,100 to 2,150 undergraduate and from 12,100 
to 150 graduate and post-graduate.  The study included private and public institutions in two stages of analysis. 
 
In stage 1 of the study, a sample of 56 non-Center of Excellence ABET institutions were identified by the 
authors, in January – March 2004, based on the reputations of the schools as advanced in technology curricula.  The 
content of catalog and descriptive information of undergraduate, graduate, and post-graduate curricula, furnished by 
technology and non-technology departments of the institutions, was analyzed for inclusion of security education and 
environment features.  Course descriptions, not titles, were analyzed in the stage.  Information on the Internet sites of 
the schools was additionally evaluated in this stage. Other practitioner literature on the institutions, in publications 
such as U.S. News and World Report, was evaluated for indication of security education. 
 
In stage 2 of this study, 44 out of the 56 non-Center of Excellence ABET institutions in stage 1 responded to 
a survey by the authors, in April – October 2004, on conformance of security education and environment features to 
Center of Academic Excellence criteria.  The institutions in this stage are confidentially indicated by state in Table 3 
below.   An average of three Deans, Associate or Assistant Deans, Chairs, or full time professors in the computer 
science, engineering or information systems schools, in each of the institutions, were surveyed independently and 
individually on the telephone by one of the authors.  Surveys averaged one to three hours per respondent and were 
based on a checklist instrument of 41 Information Assurance criteria categories indicated in Table 2 of this study.  The 
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content of the instrument was checked prior to the survey by an academic non-author who has expertise in Center of 
Excellence certification and security education.  (The checklist instrument is available upon request of the principal 
author.) 
 
During stage 2, the authors confirmed conformance or non-conformance of Information Assurance in 
courses, modules in courses, and content in courses.  They evaluated, where feasible, courses in the technology and 
non-technology curricula and programs of the institutions from selected syllabi and the survey.  They further 
evaluated, where feasible, non-conformance or conformance to elements of NSTISSI 4011 – 4015 standards.   To the 
category responses of the survey, the authors applied a simple 7-point rating scale from 6 – very high conformance to 
0 – no conformance to Center of Excellence criteria, though not actual Excellence maximum or minimum numeric 
values due to the complexity of a more detailed evaluation.  The quantitative data was exported by category to Excel, 
scored statistically in SPSS 11.5 by Excellence criteria in Table 2, and summarized by criteria by the authors. 
 
 
Table 3: Research Sample of Non-Center of Academic Excellence ABET Institutions 
Northeast Corridor 
State Private Institutions Public Institutions Total Institutions 
Connecticut 2 3 5 
Delaware 1 1 2 
District of Columbia 1 2 3 
Maine 1 1 2 
Maryland 0 3 3 
Massachusetts 4 1 5 
New Jersey 2 2 4 
New York 4 4 8 
Ohio 1 0 1 
Pennsylvania 5 2 7 
Vermont 1 1 2 
Rhode Island 2 0 2 
Total 24 20 44 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis of the results of the survey disclosed low scores in all of the sampled institutions.  Of the 44 
institutions, only 13 had mean scores higher than 1.0 (very low conformance of Information Assurance). The analysis 
in Table 4 indicated higher closeness in conformance in overall scores in multi-disciplinary science (92.5 score), 
encouraged practice (80.3), education partnership (76.0), encouraged research (54.0), and state of the art resources 
(52.0).  The other criteria for Centers of Excellence, in curriculum beyond borders (40.0), active faculty (18.7), full 
time faculty (10.8), other partnerships (9.8), other (6.7), concentrations of programs (0.0) and declared center (0.0), 
had lower conformance.  The results deserve specific and generic comment. 
 
As for generic comments, most of these institutions (37 / 44 schools) indicated low concern about Center of 
Excellence designation currently. Some (19) however indicated the eventual importance of Information Assurance in 
their curricula and environmental life.  Some (11) have introduced Information Assurance in business schools.  This 
latter focus, in beginning to conform to National Security Agency standards, is impacted by frequently indicated 
issues of other priorities (8) and resources (24): “We have no current resources to offer these courses”- Dean, 
Information Systems, Maryland Institution, 2004.  Other issues included shifting of educational strategies that 
precluded review of Information Assurance by the schools at the time of the study (6). 
 
As for specific comments, the institutions continued to have indication in Table 4 of efforts to enhance their 
Information Assurance curricula in multi-disciplinary science (92.5 score), encouraged practice (80.3), education 
partnership (76.0), encouraged research (54.0), and resources (52.0). Basic principles of Information Assurance, and 
project requirements and research, were included in modules of technology and non-technology courses.  Evidence of 
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faculty practice and research (18.7), and of marketing of limited Information Assurance programs and workshops in 
diverse media (40.0), was sometimes indicated in the study.  Nevertheless, the more critical Excellence determinants, 
of declared concentrations (0.0), declared center (0.0) and full time Information Assurance faculty (10.8), were 
discouragingly not in conformance in elements of NSTISSC standards, though not unanticipated by the authors.  
Interactions of the institutions with industrial and governmental institutions was also low in other partnerships (9.8) 
and other (6.7), with few of the institutions (11 schools) having records of graduated students in security related 
positions. 
 
Encouraging from the results is that, irrespective of issues, the institutions that are more business focused (29 
schools) and less liberal arts (15) in their curricula charters, and have mean scores higher than 1.5 (7), were indicated 
to be focused on becoming Centers of Excellence by 2008 or earlier.  These institutions were indicated to be less 
public (1) and more private (6) schools, an indication highlighted in the Department of Commerce Study (Evans, 
2003, page 79) that private schools are more flexible in modifying curriculum programs.  For the latter institutions, 
Center of Excellence is a defined goal in their charters. 
 
Further review of these results is needed in selected case studies, which will be finalized in mid-2005. 
 
 
Table 4: Analysis of Results of Non-Center of Excellence ABET Institution Survey 
Northeast Corridor 
    n = 44 Institutions x 41 Categories (12 Criteria) 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
“We have the role of playing Paul Revere and waking people up … If cyber-war comes – and come it will – we want 
to be prepared.  Why does it always have to be we do a great job after we are hit?” – Richard Clarke (Fisher, 2002) 
 
The conflict between the conservatism of academic institutions and the demand of society for an effective 
security strategy is an important implication of this study.  Non-Center of Academic Excellence information systems 
and computer science schools having curricula on principles of security, and not best practice applications relating to 
professional paths and skills (Spaford, 1998), are not fully helping industry and government.  Inasmuch as security 
Criteria Total Score Score per School Score per Category 
Partnerships in Information Assurance Education 228 5.2 76.0 
Information Assurance as a Multi-Disciplinary Science, Not 
a Separate Discipline 
185 4.2 92.5 
Information Assurance Not Only in Teaching, but 
Encouraged as a Practice in University 
241 5.5 80.3 
Research in Information Assurance Encouraged as a 
Practice in University 
162 3.7 54.0 
Information Assurance Curriculum beyond Geographic 
Borders of University 
160 3.6 40.0 
Faculty Active in Information Assurance Practice and 
Research and Contributing to Information Assurance 
Literature 
56 1.3 18.7 
State of the Art Information Assurance Library, References 
and Resources 
104 2.4 52.0 
Declared Concentrations of Programs 0 0.0 0.0 
Declared Center for Information Assurance Education or 
Center for Information Assurance Research 
0 0.0 0.0 
Full Time University Information Assurance Faculty 43 1.0 10.8 
Other University Information Assurance Education 
Partnerships  
49 1.1 9.8 
University Other  20 0.5 6.7 
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skills are closely linked to ever changing software and hardware technologies, schools can be at a continued 
disadvantage in fighting cyber-terrorism.  Practitioner studies indicate a lack of skilled specialists as an impediment to 
information security (Squire, 2003). Though institutions can be cognizant of this disadvantage (Roosevelt, 2005), 
efforts in enhancing curricula and programs are not considered fast enough (Carr, 2004). 
 
The importance of creativity, fastness and flexibility in improving security education strategy is another 
implementation.  Encouraging are internal initiatives, that include the Carnegie Mellon CyLab (Lindquist, 2004) and 
the Center for Information Assurance and Security (CIAS) at the University of Texas (Kelly, 2005), in implementing 
new security practices and technologies.  External initiatives, that include Georgetown University, Northeastern 
University and the University of Pennsylvania, in innovating in information sharing and new security programs 
aligned with the International Security Management Association  (ISMA) and AIS International, are helpful in models 
of security education strategy (Carr, 2004, page 13).  Programs that include security executives in forums, such as the 
Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) and Business Software Alliance (BSA) (Fisher, 2003), and 
security professionals on faculty, can be helpful in improving education in Center of Academic Excellence criteria.  
Other informal programs that include faculty enhancing the education in consultation with chief security officers, and 
having students interface with security and business professionals in internships, can be helpful in academic 
institutions (Grimaila, 2004).  Research centers initiated by academia (Ragatz, 2004) in conjunction with government 
and industry can enhance programs. 
 
Further implications of the study include the importance of funding for flexible security education strategy.  
Investment in infrastructure security strategy is frequently limited in government and industry, due to economic 
constraints.  Government incentives to academia in instruction, learning and research in new security practices and 
tools, and in securing hardware and software technologies, are however important in helping institutions conform to 
Center of Academic Excellence criteria (Berghel, 2003).  Given the high criteria to be Centers of Excellence, the 
Department of Defense, the National Cyber-Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security, and / or the 
National Security Agency, could extend funding to financially limited non-Center of Excellence institutions, if they 
demonstrate efforts in improving security curricula and programs.  Non-Center of Excellence information systems and 
computer science schools cannot be in isolation in the National Strategy to Secure Cyber-Space. 
 
Implications include the continued limited education of information systems and computer science graduates 
for positions as skilled security specialists.  Though the number of students in technology programs is lower in 2005 
than in prior periods, non-Center of Academic Excellence institutions have in general not integrated Information 
Assurance in their curricula and programs in a differentiating and innovative manner.  Initiatives of technology firms, 
such as CISCO (Grimaila, 2004), the new IBM Academic Initiative (King, 2004), Intel, Microsoft and Sun, can be 
helpful to institutions in integrating security technologies.  Internships of information systems and computer science 
students in security positions in industry and government can also be marketable and timely (Mullin, 2004).  The 
projections of a higher number of information technology positions, necessitated by government and industry through 
2012 (Datz, 2004, page 58), includes security specialists (Gross, 2005) that have to be educated initially by academic 
institutions. 
 
The final implication of the study is the need for non-Center of Academic Excellence information systems 
and computer science schools to plan for security education that is sensitive to society.  Strategy has to consist of 
expanded military, government, health and other industry initiatives, as numerous infrastructure systems and 
technologies impact security in our society (Stahl, 2004).  Security specialists in industry have to be immersed more in 
mitigating not internal application threats (Vijayan, 2004), but external infrastructure threats.  Security education that 
is holistically included in both non-technology and technology disciplines is an effective enabler of a security strategy 
in society (McCreary, 2004).  Such enabling implies further initiative is needed in non-Center of Excellence schools, 
and potentially from accreditation boards, such as ABET, in helping industry and government in an integrated security 
strategy that protects society. 
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LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR RESEARCH 
 
The study introduced a framework for researching security education, as the small sample size of academic 
institutions in the Northeast Corridor furnished a limited basis for generalization to the population of ABET 
institutions in the country.  The study included momentary investigations of several specific schools.  The impact of 
these investigations, in a short time, may have limited significance and thoroughness, so that the implications of this 
study have to be filtered by the researcher.  Further time in academic institutions, and in governmental and industrial 
organizations, planned by the authors in 2005, may improve future studies.  Though this study focused on failure 
factors in Center of Academic Excellence criteria, a total study of the evolving field of security education strategy will 
have to include success factors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study of security education, in the initial sample of institutions in the Northeast Corridor, is insightful in 
factors inhibiting Center of Excellence in Information Assurance designation.  Creativity and flexibility in the 
implementation of curricula and programs are important in enabling conformance to Center of Excellence standards.  
Government and industry help is also important in facilitating faster implementation of proactive programs.  Further 
and broader research in the topic is needed in academic institutions throughout the country.  The study furnishes a 
framework for continued research in education as a transformational force in security strategy. 
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